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State v. Gardner: North Carolina Sails into the Sargasso Sea
"If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it
is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offense." 1 This tenet,
which is commonly referred to as the guarantee against double jeopardy, is
firmly entrenched in both federal and state law.2 Ironically, however, while no
one questions the importance of the guarantee, no one seems to know exactly
what it encompasses. The rule, according to one commentator, is "more com-
monly revered than understood"; 3 and the law that surrounds it has been de-
scribed as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most
intrepid judicial navigator."
'4
One of the most controversial areas of double jeopardy law involves the
question of when a defendant can be sentenced more than once in a single trial
for what is essentially the same offense. The United States Supreme Court, view-
ing the double jeopardy provision as primarily a restraint on the courts and on
prosecutors, has held that a court may impose cumulative punishments in a sin-
gle trial pursuant to specific legislative authorization.5 In a recent North Caro-
lina case, State v. Gardner,6 the North Carolina Supreme Court parroted the
Supreme Court's holding when it wrote,
"Where [the] legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment
under two statutes, regardless of whether those statutes proscribe the
same conduct .... a court's task of statutory construction is at an end
and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose
cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial."
'7
With this holding the Gardner court overruled North Carolina precedent
without fully examining the underlying double jeopardy principles. This Note
explores the evolution of the law governing double jeopardy in a single prosecu-
tion context and concludes that the Gardner court erred in adopting the United
States Supreme Court's rule. In addition, it examines the court's newly articu-
lated standard for determining legislative intent and finds that the standard in-
1. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
2. See infira notes 30-40, 73-79 and accompanying text.
3. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 263 (1965).
4. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). According to the Delaware Supreme
Court, "[t]he Sargasso Sea is a large oval-shaped area of the North Atlantic Ocean set apart by the
presence of maritime plants, or seaweed ...." Hunter v. State, 430 A.2d 476, 480 n.2 (Del.) (citing
17 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 111 (1976)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981). Legends and
myths developed about the region during the era of the early navigators. People believed that the
area contained a blanket of netted seaweed from which it was impossible to escape. Id.; see Thomas,
Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter or Don Quixote,
the Sargasso Sea and the Gordian Knot, 62 WAsH. U.L.Q. 79, 79 (1984).
5. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983).
6. 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).
7. Id. at 460-61, 340 S.E.2d at 712 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983)).
The court's holding answered a question that neither defendant Franklin D. Gardner, Jr. nor the
State had asked. Instead, both sides had focused on the facts of the case and applied the standards
then in force in North Carolina. See Defendant Appellant's New Brief, Gardner (No. 390A84); New
Brief for the State, Gardner (No. 390A84).
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creases judicial as well as legislative power to define sentences. The supreme
court supplanted the mechanical standard that existed and replaced it with a
more ambiguous, less workable one. This Note evaluates the court's analysis of
the statutes in question, which define larceny and breaking or entering, and de-
termines that the court permitted cumulative sentencing in a situation in which
the legislature's purpose was unclear. Finally, this Note discusses the North
Carolina cases following Gardner and indicating the breadth of power that the
new law has carved out for the judiciary.
On July 7, 1982, defendant Franklin D. Gardner, Jr. broke into a home in
Gastonia, North Carolina and stole some guns, a television, and a stereo.8 De-
fendant was subsequently arrested and indicted for felonious breaking or enter-
ing and felonious larceny. 9 Upon his conviction on both charges, Gardner
appealed. He contended that felonious breaking or entering was a lesser in-
cluded offense of the felonious larceny for which he was convicted and that
therefore he could not be convicted of both crimes. The court of appeals unani-
mously and summarily dismissed this claim.10 The court relied entirely on State
v. Smith,"1 in which the court of appeals held that felonious larceny and feloni-
ous breaking or entering are separate and distinct offenses.12
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, defendant again chal-
lenged the multiple penalties on double jeopardy grounds. 13 Defendant based
8. State v. Gardner, 68 N.C. App. 515, 516, 316 S.E.2d 131, 131 (1984), aff'd, 315 N.C. 444,
340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).
9. Record at 4-5, Gardner (No. 8327SC966). Breaking or entering with the intent to commit
larceny is considered felonious larceny. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(b)(2) (1986).
10. Gardner, 68 N.C. App. at 522, 316 S.E.2d at 135.
11. 66 N.C. App. 570, 312 S.E.2d 222, disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 747, 315 S.E.2d 708 (1984).
12. Id. at 575-76, 312 S.E.2d at 225-26. In response to defendant's contention that he could not
be convicted of both felonious larceny and felonious breaking or entering, the Smith court applied
the traditional test for determining whether there are two distinct offenses. Id. For further discus-
sion of this standard, see infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. Larceny, the court explained,
requires "the wrongful taking and carrying away" of another's property; this element is not neces-
sary to establish breaking or entering. To show breaking or entering, the State must prove an ele-
ment not necessary to prove the larceny: the "breaking or entering of a building." The fact that the
breaking or entering may be used to upgrade the larceny to a felony, the court stated, "does not
change the nature of the crime" or the elements of proof. Smith, 66 N.C. App. at 575-76, 312 S.E.2d
at 225-26. Regardless of its merit, this argument reflects an attempt by the court to justify its ruling
under pre-Gardner standards. The court of appeals in Gardner did not posit any reason for this part
of its decision other than that Smith had resolved the issue by finding no double jeopardy violation.
Gardner, 68 N.C. App. at 522-23, 316 S.E. at 135. Thus, the court's decision did not break with
North Carolina double jeopardy law by following Smith.
13. Defendant also raised an evidentiary issue. He argued that the prosecutor had committed
an "error of constitutional magnitude" by questioning defendant at trial regarding his post-arrest
silence. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 446, 340 S.E.2d at 704. The court did not agree. First, the court
found that by failing to object to the cross-examination during trial, defendant had waived the right
to assert the error on appeal. Second, the court stated that the cross-examination did not violate
defendant's right to remain silent because the questions elicited answers that were consistent with
information brought out at trial and therefore had no impeaching effect. The probative value of the
evidence in question was slight, leading the court to maintain that even if the questions had violated
defendant's constitutional rights, the violation would have been of insufficient magnitude to warrant
reversal. Last, the court refused to review the issue pursuant to the "plain error" rule. Even if the
error in a particular case is an obvious one, the court claimed, relief can only be granted when the
error has a probable effect on the verdict. The questions asked on cross-examination in Gardner
were not deemed significant enough to warrant review. Id. at 447-50, 340 S.E.2d at 704-06. The
1268 [Vol. 65
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his challenge on a disagreement with the reasoning of the Smith court. 14 He
reiterated his argument that, on the facts of this case, the breaking or entering
was included in the larceny with which he was charged. When breaking or en-
tering is used to raise the larceny to a felony, defendant argued, double jeopardy
forbids punishment for more than one charge. 15
The supreme court decided that it did not matter whether the breaking or
entering was included in the felonious larceny. The court stated that even when
"the predicate crime of breaking or entering [is] used to raise the larceny charge
to the compound crime of felony larceny," a court does not violate either the
North Carolina or United States Constitution by convicting and punishing a
defendant for both charges. 16 The court determined that the federal constitu-
tional issue was controlled by a recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Missouri v. Hunter,17 which permits multiple penalties when they are unambigu-
ously authorized by the legislature. 18 Prior to Gardner, North Carolina courts
had always held that "[w]hat the state cannot do by separate indictments re-
turned successively and tried successively, it cannot do by separate indictments
returned simultaneously and consolidated for simultaneous trial."'19 The Gard-
ner court, however, asserted that these prior decisions reflected a misunder-
standing of double jeopardy principles. The majority claimed that this
confusion existed because the court had never distinguished adequately between
single prosecution and successive prosecution cases. 20 To clear up this confu-
sion and "properly" interpret the constitutional provision, the court overruled
these state cases and incorporated the United States Supreme Court's double
jeopardy test into North Carolina's constitutional law.
21
supreme court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' ruling on this issue. Id; see Gardner, 68
N.C. App. at 517, 316 S.E.2d at 131.
14. See Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 15.
15. See id. at 14-17. Defendant based his argument on the assumption that the larceny was a
felony because it was committed pursuant to a breaking or entering. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
72(b)(2) (1986). In fact, it was unclear whether the jury reached that conclusion. The State had
presented two theories on which the charge of felonious larceny could have rested. See Record at 5.
Defendant's conviction for felonious larceny could have resulted from a determination that the
goods stolen exceeded the statutory minimum or the jury could have concluded that the larceny was
committed pursuant to a breaking or entering. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (1986). The jury's
verdict did not state the theory on which it relied. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 450-51, 340 S.E.2d at 706.
In such situations, defendant claimed, the "verdict is to be construed in favor of the defendant."
Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 16-17 (relying on State v. Williams, 235 N.C. 429, 70 S.E.2d 1
(1952)).
The State argued that the jury could have based the felony larceny conviction on the theory that
the value of the stolen goods exceeded $400. See New Brief for the State at 10-11. Even if the
conviction for felonious larceny had been based on the breaking or entering, the State maintained
that the two offenses were separate and that double jeopardy did not bar the two convictions. Id. at
8-10.
16. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 451, 340 S.E.2d at 706-07.
17. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
18. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 453, 340 S.E.2d at 708.
19. State v. Midyette, 270 N.C. 229, 234, 154 S.E.2d 66, 70 (1967), overruled by State v. Gard-
ner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).
20. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (citing People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458,
484-85, 355 N.W.2d 592, 602-03 (1984)). For further discussion of Robideau, see infra notes 118-20
and accompanying text.
21. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 453, 340 S.E.2d at 708. The court attempted to distinguish the fel-
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Finally, the court examined the subject, language, and history of the crimi-
nal statutes. The court reasoned that the general assembly had intended to carve
out a portion of the larceny statute which preserved larceny's common-law fel-
ony status. The court further noted that the general assembly prescribed equal
punishment for felony larceny pursuant to a breaking or entering, and felony
breaking or entering itself. In addition, the court pointed to past cases in which
defendants had been convicted under both statutes.22 Based on this analysis the
court determined that the general assembly had intended to allow separate
penalties.
23
The majority consisted of only four members of the North Carolina
Supreme Court; Justices Frye and Martin joined Justice Exum in dissent. Jus-
tice Exum conceded that Hunter allows cumulative punishment for an offense
and its lesser included offense when the general assembly clearly condones this
result.24 He argued, however, that "Hunter was incorrectly decided," because it
was based on a misunderstanding of the double jeopardy clause.25 Although a
state court cannot overturn the United States Supreme Court on matters of fed-
eral constitutional law, the dissent asserted that the court should have refused to
follow Hunter and should have reached a contrary result under the North Caro-
lina Constitution. 26 Justice Exum stated that the majority misinterpreted
double jeopardy law and North Carolina precedent in adopting a rule inconsis-
tent with other North Carolina doctrines such as the felony murder merger
rule.27
ony-murder merger doctrine, discussed infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text, from the concept
of lesser included offenses. It found that prior cases were wrong in stating that the underlying felony
in a felony murder case is a lesser included offense of the felony murder itself. Id. at 457, 340 S.E.2d
at 710 (discussing State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972)). In this way, the court
attempted to justify the retention of the felony murder merger doctrine even in light of its holding in
Gardner. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 456-60, 340 S.E.2d at 710-12.
22. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 456, 340 S.E.2d at 710 (citing State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313
S.E.2d 523 (1984) and State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983)).
23. Id. at 461-63, 340 S.E.2d at 712-14.
24. Id. at 463, 340 S.E.2d at 714 (Exum, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 463-64, 340 S.E.2d at 714 (Exum, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 464, 340 S.E.2d at 714 (Exum, J., dissenting). The prohibition against double jeop-
ardy is incorporated into the state constitution's law of the land clause, which provides that "[n]o
person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." N.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 19; see State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 502, 231 S.E.2d 833, 847 (1977); State v.
Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 449, 80 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1954).
27. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 464-71, 340 S.E.2d at 714-18 (Exum, J., dissenting)k For a discus-
sion of the felony-murder merger rule see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. Justice Exum
did not blame the confusion surrounding the double jeopardy issue on the failure to distinguish
between single prosecution and successive prosecution cases. Instead, he accused the Gardner ma-
jority of failing to distinguish between a situation in which a single transaction is punishable by two
or more statutes and a situation in which two statutes constitute the same offense. Gardner, 315
N.C. at 464-65, 340 S.E.2d at 714-15 (Exum, J., dissenting). According to Justice Exum, multiple
punishments may be imposed only in the first of these two examples. Then, the general assembly
may express its intent to allow multiple punishments by satisfying the Blockburger test, discussed
infra at notes 44-52 and accompanying text. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 464-65, 340 S.E.2d at 714-15
(Exum, J. dissenting).
Justice Exum further stated that the felony-murder merger doctrine clearly supported his view
of the double jeopardy issue. Justice Exum argued that the felony-murder merger doctrine was
based on double jeopardy principles and was firmly established as a part of North Carolina law. The
1270 [Vol. 65
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In addition, Justice Exum argued, the majority was incorrect in finding that
the general assembly intended to authorize multiple punishments. When the
statutes were enacted, decisions of both the North Carolina Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court indicated that multiple punishments were un-
constitutional. 28 Justice Exum reasoned that courts should presume that stat-
utes enacted by the general assembly when this was the accepted rule did not
authorize multiple punishments. Because on their face their statutes did not
support the majority's finding, the presumption could not be rebutted. There-
fore, the dissent concluded that even under the court's newly articulated stan-
dard, the majority reached the wrong result.
29
At the root of the Gardner controversy is the double jeopardy guarantee,
which appears in the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. It
reads simply: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ,,3o The double jeopardy principle emerged
hundreds of years ago31 and was deeply embedded in English common law
32
majority's efforts to alter the basis for the doctrine, Justice Exum contended, failed entirely. See id.
at 466-70, 340 S.E.2d at 715-17 (Exum, J., dissenting).
28. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 471, 340 S.E.2d at 718 (Exum, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 471-72, 340 S.E.2d at 718-19 (Exum, J., dissenting).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The provision encompasses three basic prohibitions. It protects
against retrial for the same offense following an acquittal, retrial for the same offense following a
conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
717 (1969); Gardner, 315 N.C. at 451, 340 S.E.2d at 707. This Note focuses on the protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense. For a more comprehensive discussion of double
jeopardy, see M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969) (discussing the law as it is applied in the
United States, Canada, and England); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969).
For a discussion of the protection against retrial, see Bigelow, Former Conviction and Former
Acquittal, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 487 (1957); Note, The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L.
REV. 735 (1959).
31. See J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 2-3; Comment, supra note 3, at 262 n.1. The guarantee
dates back to the days of the Greeks and Romans. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting). Under Roman law the governor could not permit a citizen to be accused of a
crime after he or she had been acquitted. J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 2. Although these guarantees
existed during ancient times, they were of limited scope and legal force because criminal procedure
was much less formal. 1d. at 2-3.
32. See M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 30, at 5-15; J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 4-16; Hunter, The
Development of the Rule Against Double Jeopardy, 5 J. LEGAL Hisr. 3 (1984). It is hard to deter-
mine exactly when the protection against double jeopardy first emerged in England. A dispute be-
tween Henry II and Archbishop Thomas f Becket in 1163 probably played a siguificant role in
introducing the concept of double jeopardy into English common law. In that year Henry retried a
clerk, de Brois, after de Brois' acquittal in the spiritual courts. Becket challenged the King's actions,
claiming that clerks tried in the ecclesiastical courts could not be retried in the King's courts. He
based his argument on the maxim nemo his in idipsum (no man ought to be punished twice for the
same offense). The fight between the two men ended with Becket's murder. However, in 1176
Henry made some concessions regarding the principles over which they had fought. See M. FRIED-
LAND, supra note 30, at 5-6; see also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 444-57 (2d ed. 1899) (chronicling the controversy between Henry and Becket).
The concept of double jeopardy developed slowly and sporadically following Henry's conces-
sion in 1176. Coke and Blackstone are attributed with clarifying the principle and endowing it with
its significance. J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 16-17. In 1769 Blackstone described four pleas that a
prisoner could give at bar when threatened with double jeopardy. J. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACK-
STONE 926-28 (1959). Two of these pleas, former attainder and former pardon, have no relevance in
modern American law. J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 20; Comment, supra note 3, at 262 n.1. The
other two pleas, former acquittal and former conviction, have continued vitality today in the prohibi-
tions against retrial after conviction and acquittal.
1987]
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long before its incorporation into the American Constitution.33 Because the
form and scope of the guarantee differed throughout its evolution, 34 there is no
consensus regarding its precise scope when it became part of American constitu-
tional law.
It is clear that the fifth amendment was meant to protect against multiple
punishments for the same offense. The version initially submitted to the First
Congress by James Madison provided that "[n]o person shall be subject, except
in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same
offence." 35 Congress changed the wording primarily to guarantee that the
clause would not be used to prevent a defendant from appealing a conviction.
36
Thus, the change further ensured the rights of accused persons and did not limit
the scope of the provision. 37 The Supreme Court recognized this in 1873 in Ex
parte Lange :38
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than
one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the
same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty,
he can never be tried again for that offense? Manifestly it is not the
danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the pun-
ishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the
real danger guarded against by the Constitution....
... [T]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the crim-
inal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being
twice tried for it.
39
No court disputes the enduring vitality of the principle enunciated in
Lange.40 The confusion arises in trying to determine exactly when two provi-
sions punish "the same offense" as it is defined in double jeopardy law. In some
cases two sentences obviously do not involve the same offense. For example, a
criminal may be convicted of committing two murders when he or she kills two
individuals. A criminal also may be sentenced for both robbery and murder.
The cases, however, are not always this clear. For example, an individual may
injure two people by firing one gunshot.41 Moreover, a person could be sen-
33. Comment, supra note 3, at 262 n. 1. The guarantee also existed in the United States prior to
its adoption as part of the fifth amendment. The doctrine was a part of the common law and became
expressly included in the codes and constitutions of many states. See J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 21-
27; Bigelow, supra note 30, at 487-88. The double jeopardy prohibition in America was broader than
the guarantee in England and has influenced the development of the protection in that country. See
Hunter, supra note 32, at 15.
34. See J. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 1-27. Sigler attributes this largely to changes in both
substantive criminal law and the state of criminal procedure. See id. at 7.
35. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433 (1789).
36. Bigelow, supra note 30, at 488. The adopted version also used the standard double jeopardy
terminology. See Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's
Multiple Punishment Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J. 632, 635 n.16 (1981).
37. Note, Criminal Law: The Permissibility of Multiple Punishments for One Criminal Offense:
Missouri v. Hunter and Its Effect on Oklahoma Law, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 875, 876-77 (1983).
38. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
39. Id. at 173.
40. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) (double jeopardy protects against
multiple punishment).
41. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (one offense). See also Bell v. United States,
1272 [vol. 65
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tenced for both conspiracy to import drugs and conspiracy to distribute the
same drugs or two similar overlapping offenses.42 Finally, one could be con-
victed of both a crime and its lesser included offense, such as stealing an automo-
bile and operating that same automobile without the owner's consent.
43
In difficult cases, courts traditionally have resorted to the Blockburger rule.
This rule, as explained in Blockburger v. United States,44 states that "where the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provi-
sions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."' 45 In Blockburger defendant was charged with three counts based on two
illegal sales of morphine to the same buyer. Applying this test, the Court held
that defendant could be punished twice for the second sale-for not selling the
morphine in its original stamped package and for selling the drug without a
prescription.
46
After Blockburger courts systematically used this test to decide when a leg-
islature had intended for a single transaction to be punishable under more than
one statute. If each statute required proof of even one additional element, then
the courts could punish a crime under both laws. This was true even in cases
involving substantial overlap in the proof necessary to support the multiple con-
victions.47 If no additional facts were needed to obtain the second conviction,
however, then the second statute was "included" in the first, and double jeop-
ardy barred the second conviction.
48
349 U.S. 81 (1955) (transporting two women across state line in one vehicle for "immoral purposes"
constituted only one offense). In each of these cases, the Supreme Court determined that the legisla-
ture had intended to impose only one penalty for the act in question. The Court applied the rule of
lenity, discussed infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text, which dictates that courts resolve ambi-
guities in favor of the less harsh interpretation. Therefore, the Court did not reach the double jeop-
ardy issue. For an example of a case in which the Court's analysis yielded a different conclusion, see
Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915) (successive cuttings of mailbags with criminal intent consti-
tuted separate offenses that could be separately punished).
42. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (two offenses).
43. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (one offense). Although Brown involved successive
prosecutions, the test applied-the Blockburger test, discussed infra at notes 44-52 and accompany-
ing text-reflects the standard then used in cases involving single prosecutions as well. See Brown,
432 U.S. at 166. Later cases limited the test's applicability in single prosecution situations. This
development in the law is discussed infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise
noted, the cases mentioned involving successive prosecutions apply the same analysis that would be
used in single prosecutions.
44. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The test did not originate in the Blockburger case, however. In fact,
the Blockburger Court expressly relied on Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), as author-
ity for the proposition. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Gavieres, in turn, adopted a standard earlier
articulated in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).
45. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
46. Id. at 303-04. The Court also found that the sales comprised "distinct and separate sales
made at different times." Id. at 301.
47. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
48. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam) (underlying felony of rob-
bery included in felony-murder charge by concession of the State; successive prosecution barred);
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (joyriding included in automobile theft; successive prosecution
barred). This analysis still applies to successive prosecutions and to single prosecutions in cases in
which the legislative intent is unclear. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 n.8 (1984); Thomas, A
Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1985).
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The language used in Blockburger, however, does not suggest that the rule
is one of constitutional magnitude.49 Instead, the Blockburger decision focused
on the intent of the legislature.50 On its face, the doctrine allows courts to by-
pass a double jeopardy analysis when its application yields one of two results. If
two statutes create distinct offenses under the test, then no double jeopardy
problem arises when an individual receives cumulative punishments.51 If the
two statutes constitute the same offense under Blockburger because they deal
with an offense and its lesser included offense, then the prosecutor may charge a
defendant with both crimes so long as the court only imposes a single sentence.52
It is only when the two offenses are the same and multiple penalties are still
imposed that double jeopardy enters into the analysis.
The emphasis that the Blockburger rule places on statutory construction
and legislative intent made it relatively easy for the Supreme Court to narrow
the rule's application in single prosecution situations. Before the Court ex-
pressly limited the scope of the doctrine in Hunter,5 3 there were a few cases that
heralded the change. In Whalen v. United States,5 4 for example, the Court held
that federal legislation did not permit the imposition of cumulative punishments
for felony murder and the underlying felony of rape. The Court's opinion, how-
ever, indicated that the double jeopardy clause may not always preclude cumula-
tive sentences for the same offense: "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause at the very
least precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless au-
thorized by Congress to do so."'55 Whalen thus implied that with express congres-
sional authorization a court could impose multiple penalties. In his concurring
opinion Justice Blackmun urged the Court to expressly adopt this doctrine and
stated that "[t]he only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases chal-
lenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more
charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the
Legislative Branch intended."'56 This, he contended, would clear up the confu-
sion caused by language in prior cases suggesting that the Court held a contrary
view.57
49. Note, supra note 37, at 878. Subsequent cases, however, discussed both double jeopardy
and the Blockburger rule together. See, eg., Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151 (1977) (two
offenses considered the same for double jeopardy purposes when each requires proof of no additional
fact); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1977) (stating that Blockburger set forth the test used to
determine whether there was a double jeopardy violation).
50. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303-04.
51. See id. at 304.
52. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 372 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. The Hunter Court held that a legislature can authorize multiple punishments for a single
offense in a single trial. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69; see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
54. 445 U.S. 684 (1980). In Whalen defendant received consecutive sentences for rape and for
killing his victim in the perpetration of the rape. He appealed, taking the position that double jeop-
ardy principles mandated the application of the felony-murder merger doctrine, discussed infra notes
87-90 and accompanying text, and that he could not be cumulatively punished under both statutes.
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 685-86.
55. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 697 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 697-98 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was referring to Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-13 (1978), and Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977). Both
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In Albernaz v. United States5 8 a strict application of the Blockburger rule
established that conspiracy to import marihuana was distinct from conspiracy to
sell the same marihuana.5 9 The Court's analysis, however, did not end at that
point. The opinion went on to state that "[t]he Blockburger test is a rule of
statutory construction... [that] should not be controlling where, for example,
there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 6 Although the crimes
in Albernaz survived the Blockburger analysis, the Court's dicta indicated that it
was prepared to find that Blockburger was not constitutionally mandated and
that multiple penalties could stand under the proper circumstances.
61
It was Missouri v. Hunter62, however, that took the dicta in Albernaz and
transformed it into law. At issue in Hunter were convictions for robbery in the
first degree, armed criminal action, and assault with malice. All three convic-
tions resulted from a single criminal transaction, the armed robbery of a grocery
store.63 The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for
armed criminal action on double jeopardy grounds.64 The United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case following the Missouri Supreme Court's
refusal to do so.
65
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Missouri law permitted sentenc-
ing for both armed criminal action and the underlying felony of first degree
robbery.66 The Court accepted the Missouri Court of Appeals' conclusion that
the two statutes defined the same offense, but held that this fact was irrelevant in
light of the legislature's express intention to permit multiple punishments.67
The Court relied on its reasoning in Whalen and Albernaz68 to conclude that
when legislatures permit multiple punishments, courts may impose them.69
cases implied that two statutes must always be evaluated in light of the Blockburger rule when the
State presents the same evidence to obtain both convictions.
58. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
59. Id. at 339. The Court reasoned that the two provisions "specified] different ends as the
proscribed object of the conspiracy-distribution as opposed to importation," and concluded that
each provision required proof of an additional fact. Id.
60. Id. at 340.
61. Id. at 344 (dictum).
62. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
63. Id. at 361-62.
64. See State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 359
(1983). The court's decision rested entirely on prior decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court.
Those opinions had held that under the Blockburger test, robbery in the first degree and armed
criminal action comprised the same offense. Id. at 375 (citing State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo.
1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982); Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981) (Sours II), and Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.) (en banc), va-
cated, 446 U.S. 962 (1980) (Sours I)).
65. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 363.
66. Id. at 368-69. The Court stated that the Missouri Supreme Court had recognized "the
[Missouri] legislature intended that punishment for violaton of the statutes be cumulative." Id. at
368.
67. Id. at 366-68.
68. Id. at 368.
69. Id. at 368-69. The Court's holding ended a conflict with the Missouri Supreme Court over
the breadth of the double jeopardy guarantee. For an account of that conflict, see Thomas, supra
note 4, at 81-84, 96-106; Note, Missouri v. Hunter and the Legislature: Double Punishment Without
Double Jeopardy, 37 ARK. L. REv. 1000, 1008-1003 (1984); Note, supra note 37, at 880-81.
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As a result of the Hunter decision, federal law permits cumulative punish-
ment in certain situations. The Hunter decision purported to untie the hands of
the legislative branch while keeping courts and prosecutors bound by the double
jeopardy prohibition. Although the legislature is free to permit multiple penal-
ties, the courts and prosecutors may only impose them pursuant to legislative
authorization. When this authorization does not exist, courts must still resort to
the Blockburger test.70 Thus, the Blockburger rule remains useful even in a
single prosecution analysis because the legislative intent is not always clear. In
applying this test the rule of lenity serves as a further limitation on the courts.
This rule requires courts to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the more
lenient interpretation. 7 1 The courts only apply the rule of lenity when the
Blockburger test does not yield a clear result. 72 When the Blockburger test
clearly prohibits multiple punishment, the rule of lenity is not reached.
The Supreme Court's pronouncements in the area of double jeopardy law
have been binding on the states ever since 1969, when Benton v. Maryland
73
incorporated the guarantee into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
North Carolina, however, protected its citizens against double jeopardy long
before Benton. As early as 1869, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
"That no person for the same offence can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,
is a sacred principle of common law." 74 State v. Mansfield,75 a 1934 decision,
grounded this principle in the state constitution as well.76 By 1954 the supreme
court described the guarantee as "an integral part of the 'law of the land'"
clause of the state constitution. 77 This guarantee also extended to the protection
against multiple punishments.78 The North Carolina Supreme Court asserted
that, because double jeopardy principles were already established as a part of
state law, Benton added nothing to North Carolina law.
79
In fact, North Carolina had already developed a system of analysis not un-
70. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366-69.
71. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955). The rule of lenity, in turn, is qualified by
the proviso in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958). Gore warned that courts should not be
lenient in interpreting laws in areas in which the legislature has manifested an attitude of severity.
See id. at 390. Because Congress had expressed such an attitude towards violators of narcotics laws,
the Court in Gore allowed multiple punishments under three separate provisions. Id. at 386. The
Court stressed that, in so doing, it was not overruling either Blockburger or Bell. Id. at 388, 391.
72. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 54-56 (proposing a five-step rule for analyzing double jeop-
ardy problems in the wake of the Hunter decision).
73. 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
74. State v. Prince, 63 N.C. 529, 531 (1869).
75. 207 N.C. 233, 176 S.E. 761 (1934).
76. Id. at 233, 176 S.E. at 761. The Mansfield opinion indicated that the guarantee against
double jeopardy was generally accepted as a state constitutional guarantee. Although the principle
was not discussed in the case, the court stated the rule in a headnote, citing only the state constitu-
tion and the fifth amendment for support. Id.
77. State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 449, 80 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1954) (quoting N.C. CONSr. art. I,
§ 19); see supra note 26.
78. State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 198, 195 S.E.2d 481,485 (1973) (dicta); State v. Summrell,
282 N.C. 157, 173, 192 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1972) (conviction for assault of an officer reversed because it
constitutes the same offense as resisting arrest); State v. Parker, 262 N.C. 679, 684, 138 S.E.2d 496,
500 (1964) (conviction for assault with deadly weapon reversed because duplicate of conviction for
robbery with firearms).
79. State v. Battle, 279 N.C. 484, 486, 183 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1971).
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like that applied by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger. North
Carolina courts commonly referred to their version as "the additional facts
test."'80 A court applying this double jeopardy test conducted a two-part exami-
nation. First, it analyzed the facts of the case and determined whether those
alleged in the second indictment were sufficient to sustain a conviction under the
first indictment. Then, the court examined the indictments themselves and
asked whether at least one additional fact was necessary in each.81 The offenses
did not pose a double jeopardy problem if "each offense required proof of an
additional fact which the other did not."'8 2 Thus, the United States Supreme
Court's Benton decision did not force the North Carolina courts to change the
framework of their double jeopardy analysis.
In some ways North Carolina law was much clearer than federal law in its
articulation of the double jeopardy doctrine.8 3 State v. Midyette84 firmly estab-
lished the rule that the State could not sidestep double jeopardy considerations
merely by consolidating the indictments and presenting them at one trial. If
double jeopardy barred successive prosecutions, then it also barred multiple
punishments.8 5 Subsequent North Carolina cases adhered to this doctrine.
8 6
North Carolina courts often used the double jeopardy rule to prevent the
State from obtaining convictions for both felony murder and the underlying fel-
ony.87 State v. Thompson 88 explicitly based the rule, called the felony-murder
80. State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 500-01, 124 S.E.2d 838, 844 (1962) (citation omitted);
State v. Cannon, 38 N.C. App. 322, 325-26, 248 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1978) (citations omitted).
81. See, eg., State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 502-03, 231 S.E.2d 833, 847 (1977); State v. Martin,
47 N.C. App. 223, 231, 267 S.E.2d 35, 40, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 238, 283 S.E.2d 134 (1980). The
first part of this analysis showed whether the second offense involved was the same offense as the first
in fact; the second test determined whether the two offenses were the same in law. Thus, North
Carolina departed from a strict application of the Blockburger rule, looking at the facts of the case in
addition to the statutes. This approach, however, is in accord with subsequent United States
Supreme Court decisions. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709 (citing Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)).
82. State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 184, 301 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1983) (citations omitted), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985).
83. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 464, 340 S.E.2d at 714 (Exum, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur precedents
speak with one clear, unambiguous voice on the subject.") A state court may interpret a constitu-
tional standard differently than the United States Supreme Court under the state constitution as long
as the state does not limit the breadth of the protection afforded by the federal constitution. See
infra note 97.
84. 270 N.C. 229, 154 S.E.2d 66 (1967), overruled by State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340
S.E.2d 701 (1986).
85. See id. at 233-34, 154 S.E.2d at 70. In Midyette defendant was convicted of both assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and resisting, delaying, and obstructing his own arrest.
Defendant did not challenge his convictions on double jeopardy grounds. Nevertheless, the supreme
court determined that the two convictions punished precisely the same conduct and arrested judg-
ment in the case. Id.
86. E.g., State v. Partin, 48 N.C. App. 274, 282, 269 S.E.2d 250, 255, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C.
404, 273 S.E.2d 449 (1980).
87. The felony-murder doctrine allows a court to charge a defendant with first-degree murder
when he or she has killed an individual during the commission of a felony. The theory used to justify
the rule is that the defendant's intent to commit the felony supplies the intent to kill that is necessary
for the murder charge. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 545-61 (1972). In North
Carolina the doctrine is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986). Another statute allows the
State to obtain a conviction for first-degree murder cases in which defendant caused the death of an
individual while he or she was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit a felony. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-2000(e)(5) (1983); State v. Moore, 284 N.C. 485, 494, 202 S.E.2d 169, 174-75
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merger rule, on a double jeopardy theory:
The conviction of defendant for felony-murder, that is, murder in the
first degree without proof of malice, premeditation or deliberation, was
based on a finding by the jury that the murder was committed in the
perpetration of the felonious breaking and entering. In this sense, the
felonious breaking and entering was a lesser included offense of the
felony murder.... If defendant had been acquitted in a prior trial of
the separate charge of felonious breaking and entering, a plea of former
jeopardy would have precluded subsequent prosecution on the theory
of felony-murder.
89
When Gardner was decided, this rationale was accepted as the rationale for the
merger doctrine.90
Thus, Gardner broke with North Carolina law in a few major respects. It
overruled Midyette, abandoning the traditional principle that double jeopardy
protection was as great in single prosecution situations as in successive prosecu-
tion situations.91 It also criticized the previously asserted rationale for the fel-
ony-murder merger doctrine.92
The court did not have to decide Gardner this way. As Justice Exum
pointed out in his dissent in Gardner, the Hunter decision does not compel state
supreme courts to change their state laws.93 State judges are free to indepen-
dently interpret their own constitutions as long as the decisions neither directly
conflict with existing federal doctrine94 nor limit federally mandated constitu-
tional guarantees. 95 In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins96 the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged the states' right in this area: "Our reasoning in [a
particular case] ... does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to
exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution." 97
(1974). North Carolina common law further provides that if the felony is used to obtain a conviction
for first-degree murder, the defendant cannot also be sentenced for the underlying felony. This is
known as the merger rule. See State v. Carey, 288 N.C. 254, 274, 218 S.E.2d 387, 400 (1975), death
sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
88. 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
89. Id. at 215-16, 185 S.E.2d at 675 (citation omitted). The court found that defendant had
been convicted of felony murder because he had committed the murder in the perpetration of the
felonies of breaking or entering and larceny. Accordingly, the court arrested the judgment for the
underlying felonies. Id. at 217, 185 S.E.2d at 676.
90. See cases cited infra note 155.
91. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 454, 340 S.E.2d at 708.
92. Id. at 457-59, 340 S.E.2d at 709-10.
93. See id. at 464, 340 S.E.2d at 714 (Exum, J., dissenting).
94. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (state court decisions subject to distur-
bance to the extent that they "fail to honor federal rights and duties"); Sager, Foreward: State
Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV.
959, 959 (1985).
95. See, eg., State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 520-21, 142 S.E.2d 344, 344-46 (1965) (state can
interpret its own constitution, but is bound to accept the United States Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the minimum scope of prisoners' rights under the due process clause).
96. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
97. Id. at 81. The Court in Pruneyard affirmed a decision of the California Supreme Court, in
which the California court claimed that the state constitution provided some protection to those who
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North Carolina law reflects this principle. The law of the land clause,
which includes the double jeopardy guarantee,98 is synonymous with the due
process clause.99 In addition, the North Carolina courts have always viewed
United States Supreme Court due process decisions as "persuasive" in interpret-
ing North Carolina's law of the land clause.1° ° The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, has repeatedly asserted that "in the construction of [a] provi-
sion of the State Constitution, the meaning given by the Supreme Court of the
United States to even an identical term in the Constitution of the United States
is... not binding upon this Court." 10 1 In Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribu-
tors, Inc. 102 the North Carolina Supreme Court invalidated a fair trade statute
as unconstitutional under the state constitution although the United States
Supreme Court-had reached the opposite result in an Illinois case involving an
spoke and petitioned on private premises. The Court upheld this decision in spite of Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 67-81 (1972), which reached a contrary result under the United States Consti-
tution. See also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 292 (1982) (Supreme Court
will not reverse a ease based on its disagreement with a lower court's interpretation of federal law if
that court also rests its decision on independent state grounds); Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 504 (1977) (commenting that the drafters of
the Bill of Rights "would welcome the broadening by state courts of the reach of state constitutional
counterparts beyond the' federal model.")
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). does not invalidate this fundamental principle. In
Long the Supreme Court reversed a Michigan Supreme Court decision that ostensibly rested on both
the state and federal constitutions. The Court contended that the references to the Michigan Consti-
tution did not evidence an independent state ground for the decision. The Michigan court, the
Supreme Court claimed, relied exclusively on federal law to interpret the state constitution. Id. at
1037. Therefore, the Supreme Court had the authority to review the Michigan court's analysis and
holding. See id. at 1040-41. The Court emphasized, however, that when a state court "indicates
clearly and expressly that [its decision] is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision." Id. at 1041. Thus,
the states' rights in this respect are unquestioned. As one commentator noted, this is one of the few
areas of law in which liberals and conservatives are in agreement, even though their rationales differ.
Liberals want the state courts to protect individual rights. Conservatives, on the other hand, empha-
size the importance of properly allocating power between the federal government and the state gov-
ernment. Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1081,
1092-93 (1985).
The growing trend on the part of state courts to interpret their state constitutional guarantees
more broadly than the federal guarantees is a result of the current Supreme Court's retreat from the
positions of the Warren Court on issues involving individual rights. See, eg., State v. Alston, 88 N.J.
211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (automatic standing rule retained in New Jersey despite United States
Supreme Court decision limiting scope of standing in federal law); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423
A.2d 615 (1980) (interpreting right to speak and right to assemble); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d
144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (noting the "heightened privacy protection" accorded by Washington in
the area of search and seizure law). For a more detailed study of this topic, see Abrahamson, Crimi-
nal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141
(1985); Brennan, supra; Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 708 (1983).
98. See supra note 26, and notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
99. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 480, 340 S.E.2d 720, 725 (1986); State v. Ballance, 229
N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949).
100. In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 600, 281 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1981); see Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand
Distrib., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974); Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353,
359, 177 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1970), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290
S.E.2d 675 (1982).
101. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974);
see Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 480, 340 S.E.2d 720, 725 (1986); Gardner, 315 N.C. at 464,
340 S.E.2d at 714; Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353, 359, 177 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1970).
102. 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
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identical statute.10 3 In another case the North Carolina Supreme Court applied
its own standard of review to determine whether a license revocation procedure
was constitutional under the state constitution; 1 4 the court's rationale was that
the federal balancing test was inadequate.10 5 Under these precedents, the Gard-
ner court could have retained its traditional double jeopardy standard by hold-
ing multiple punishments unconstitutional under the North Carolina
Constitution.
The Gardner majority, however, appeared to overlook this fact in reaching
its decision to conform to the Hunter rule.10 6 Early in its discussion of the issue,
the court stated that it would decide whether the multiple convictions violated
either the state or the federal constitution. 107 The opinion that followed, how-
ever, largely ignored North Carolina precedent. Instead, the court focused on
the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court without independently
analyzing the issue under the state constitution; then, in overruling Midyette, the
court merely stated that "the holding in that case has been rendered no longer
authoritative." 10 8
To the extent that it did consider North Carolina decisions in reaching this
conclusion, the court's reliance was misplaced. The court first quoted State v.
Murray, 0 9 which stated that the United States Supreme Court allows the impo-
sition of cumulative punishments in a single trial. Although the court's lan-
guage in Murray implied that the state was ready to adopt the Hunter rule, the
court never reached the issue. Instead, the court in Murray applied the addi-
tional facts test and found that the two statutes were distinct.110 The Gardner
court relied on dicta in reaching its decision to overrule years of North Carolina
precedent. " 1
The other state case mentioned by the majority in this part of its decision
was State v. Perry." 2 The Perry court emphasized that in determining whether
defendant could be punished for both larceny of property and possession of the
same property, courts must focus on the general assembly's intent." 1 3 The Perry
court, however, viewed legislative intent as an additional limitation that arose
only after a court deemed the two statutes "separate and distinct" under the
103. See id. at 474, 206 S.E.2d at 146.
104. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 480, 340 S.E.2d 720, 725 (1986). The court nevertheless
reached the same conclusion under both state and federal law.
105. Id. at 490-91, 340 S.E.2d at 731.
106. In other parts of its analysis, however, the court did deviate slightly from the United States
Supreme Court's approach. See infra notes 147-148, and text accompanying notes 196-97.
107. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 451, 340 S.E.2d at 707.
108. Id. at 454, 340 S.E.2d at 708. According to the court, this result was dictated by two
United States Supreme Court decisions and dicta in a state decision that merely recited the Hunter
holding. Id. The court clearly assumed that Hunter was controlling. Id. at 453, 340 S.E.2d at 708.
109. 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984).
110. Id. at 547-49, 313 S.E.2d at 528-29.
111. In addition, the Murray case did not reach a conclusion regarding whether North Carolina
should adopt this rule. It merely recited the Hunter doctrine without discussing it. Id. at 547, 313
S.E,2d at 528.
112. 305 N.C. 225, 287 S.E.2d 810 (1982).
113. Id. at 231-35, 287 S.E.2d at 814-16.
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additional facts test. A court first had to ask whether the two statutes created
separate offenses. If the statutes survived this scrutiny, the court then had to
decide whether the general assembly wanted to impose multiple punishments.
At this point in the analysis, the intent of the general assembly came to the fore.
Even if multiple penalties were possible under the more mechanical additional
facts test, a finding that the general assembly did not want to allow cumulative
sentencing would preclude their imposition. 114 The decision did not suggest
that the general assembly could impose multiple punishments when the two stat-
utes were the same; instead, the court apparently presumed that this was impos-
sible because of existing double jeopardy doctrine.1 15 Although the Gardner
court cited Perry for the proposition that legislative intent is determinative,
Perry really stated that legislative intent is determinative provided that the gen-
eral assembly did not attempt to do something unconstitutional. Thus, the Perry
decision indicated adherence to the traditional double jeopardy analysis rather
than a shift away from it.
The Gardner court also relied on People v. Robideau.11 6 In Robideau the
Michigan Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not preclude punish-
ment for both first degree criminal sexual assault and the felony used to raise the
sexual assault to a first degree offense. 117 The North Carolina court echoed the
Michigan court's conclusion that the failure to distinguish between single and
successive prosecution situations is at the root of the confusion surrounding
double jeopardy law.'18
Where successive prosecutions are involved, the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects the individual's interest in not having to twice "run the
gauntlet," in not being subjected to "embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal," and in not being compelled "to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity .... "
[W]hen the issue is purely one of multiple punishments.... [t]he
right to be free from vexatious proceedings simply is not present. The
only interest of the defendant is in not having more punishment im-
posed than that intended by the Legislature .... 119
Apparently, this distinction is at the heart of the Gardner decision as well. In
switching over to the Hunter rule, the North Carolina Supreme Court made an
implicit statement regarding its view of the nature of the double jeopardy prohi-
bition. According to the court, the clause operates solely as a restraint on the
courts and the prosecutors. This leaves the general assembly almost unchecked
114. Id.
115. See id. at 234-35, 287 S.E.2d at 815-16.
116. 419 Mich. 458, 355 N.W.2d 592 (1984).
117. Id. at 488-90, 355 N.W.2d at 604-05.
118. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (quoting Robideau, 419 Mich. at 484-85, 355
N.W.2d at 602-03). The Michigan Supreme Court also claimed that other courts have reached
confusing and inconsistent conclusions partly because they mix factual and statutory analysis. Ro-
bideau, 419 Mich. at 476-80, 355 N.W.2d at 599-600.
119. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (quoting Robideau, 419 Mich. at 484-85, 355
N.W.2d at 602-03).
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in its ability to define offenses and prescribe sentences. 120
The Gardner decision, however, does not explore this premise or address
the arguments that run counter to it. The discussion that it sidestepped is at the
core of the double jeopardy debate. By stating that those who disagree with
Hunter do not understand the double jeopardy clause, 12 1 the court grossly over-
simplified the controversy and confusion that engulf this aspect of fifth amend-
ment law.
A number of commentators agree with the view taken by the Gardner
court, and have expanded further on its rationale. 122 The first rationale is that
the legislature is the branch of government with the power to create and define
offenses and set the minimum and maximum sentences for those offenses. Ac-
cording to this view, any effort to limit the legislature's ability to provide for
cumulative sentencing would be meaningless and illogical:
Suppose that an eccentric legislature chose to enact this statute:
The sentence for robbery shall be five years imprisonment. Anyone
who commits robbery shall be twice convicted and punished.
Can it be said that this statute is outside the power of the legislature?
[ .. T]he legislature has merely exercised its legitimate penological
power in a preposterously roundabout fashion. It could have accom-
plished exactly the same doubling of the penalties simply by doubling
the penalty for robbery.
12 3
To those holding this view, the sole purpose of the double jeopardy clause in a
single trial situation is to limit the role of the courts and the prosecutors. Partly
because any effort to check the legislature would be illusory, supporters of this
view contend that the legislature should not be checked by the double jeopardy
clause. 
12 4
The second rationale supporting the Gardner rule is that as a natural corol-
lary to its sentencing power, the legislature sets limits on the courts, and prose-
cutors' authority to punish defendants more than the statutes allow. When a
court challenges the legislature's authority to limit the judicial branch's sentenc-
ing power, it violates "the constitutional principle of separation of powers."
125
A court arguably would also exceed its authority and intrude on the role of the
legislature by declaring that the legislature cannot allow courts to punish cumu-
latively in one trial. 126 This argument, however, is inconsistent with the asser-
120. The only limitation on the general assembly's ability to do so is that it will not be able to
provide for cumulative sentencing over successive prosecutions.
121. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 451-53, 340 S.E.2d at 707-08.
122. See, eg., Thomas, supra note 48; Thomas, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 3; see also
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal
Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1023-33 (1980) (written prior to Hunter, but advocating the view
that "the double jeopardy clause operates as a rebuttable presumption against multiple
punishment").
123. Comment, supra note 3, at 302; see also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392-93 (if
Congress has the power to provide for certain punishment in one statute, it is irrational to forbid
Congress from providing for same punishment in two statutes).
124. See Comment, supra note 3, at 302.
125. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
126. This argument, however, does not recognize that in the first situation the judicial branch
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tion that any double jeopardy limitation on the legislature in a single prosecution
context is illusory1 27 and is not overtly relied on in the relevant Supreme Court
decisions.
Regardless of these rationales, commentators who agree with the Hunter
rule cannot avoid the clear language of the double jeopardy provision, which
expressly forbids two punishments for one offense. 12 8 To avoid constitutional
problems, courts following this doctrine apparently read "twice" as having tem-
poral connotations-that is, they claim that "twice" means "'two separate
times."1 2 9 In addition, they flexibly interpret the definition of "offense" so that
it means exclusively what the legislature intends in each situation. 130 The legis-
lature can divide a single continuous offense into several smaller offenses; it can
allow punishment for all such offenses and their lesser included offenses and it
can punish the same act in two different statutes providing that the courts can
cumulatively punish defendants for precisely the same crime.
131
Opponents of the Hunter rule disagree with it largely on constitutional
grounds. They argue that "although the legislative power is broad it cannot
make a circle square by definition." 132 As its opponents point out, the Hunter
rule allows legislatures to do just that by permitting them to define the same
offense as two "different" crimes. 133 This, in turn, renders the double jeopardy
clause a partially illusory guarantee that retains vitality only in the area of suc-
cessive prosecutions. A literal reading of the clause results in the inevitable con-
clusion that the Hunter rule conflicts with the fifth amendment's double
jeopardy guarantee.
The arguments set forth by the proponents of the Hunter rule do not out-
weigh the constitutional guarantee embodied in the fifth amendment. First, they
argue, the limitation that the Blockburger rule placed on the legislatures was
slight. A legislature could always prescribe a higher penalty in a single statute if
the double jeopardy ban thwarted its efforts to achieve the same result in several
statutes. In a single prosecution context, the rule merely limited the legislature's
intrudes on the legislative branch "in a manner that trenches particularly harshly on individual
liberty." Id. In that situation, individual liberty weighs into the decision to forbid such judicial
overreaching. In the Hunter-type situation, on the other hand, it is in the defendant's best interest to
declare that the double jeopardy clause limits the legislature as well. Nevertheless, as Hunter and its
progeny reveal, the distinction between these two situations does not mandate a different outcome.
127. See Comment, supra note 3, at 302.
128. See U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
129. See, eg., Robideau, 419 Mich. at 484-85, 355 N.W.2d at 602-03; Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452,
340 S.E.2d at 707.
130. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
131. Commentators who recognize the need to place restraints on an overzealous legislature find
this need satisfied by the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment
rather than the double jeopardy provision. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For a discussion of this
view, see Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81,
114-15. According to these commentators, the danger inherent in allowing the legislature unlimited
power in defining crimes and prescribing sentences is that punishments will be excessive. Id. at 114.
If a sentence is excessive, it should be held invalid under the eighth amendment rather than under
the fifth. Id. at 115; see Westen, supra note 122, at 1024-25.
132. Robideau, 419 Mich. at 502, 355 N.W.2d at 611 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting in part).
133. Id.
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ability to impose penalties in a roundabout, cumbersome way when more direct
means were possible. It did not limit the legislature's ability to proscribe crimes;
Blockburger only demanded that the legislature do so in a constitutional man-
ner.1 34 Contrary to the contentions of commentators who agree with the Hunter
decision, 13 that the limitation is slight does not mean there is no reason for
restraining the legislature in a single prosecution situation. Instead, the double
jeopardy argument seems more reasonable because the legislature has other ef-
fective means for carrying out its duties. 13 6 The double jeopardy clause would
be less likely to apply in this context if, instead, it worked to thwart the
legislature.
Furthermore, the limit that the clause places on the legislature in a single
prosecution context is important. The Hunter rule fails to recognize that the
defendant in a criminal trial has more at risk than the threat of a prison sen-
tence. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Hunter, a defendant is "put in
jeopardy" as to each charge.137 Multiple convictions may increase the possibil-
ity that more severe sentences will be imposed and increase the social stigma
that follows the defendant. 138 Perhaps the most significant risk is that multiple
punishments increase the chance that the defendant will later suffer enhanced
punishment under a habitual offender statute. 139 If the defendant is only con-
victed for one felony, for example, he or she will not be subject to an enhanced
penalty if later arrested for another offense. If the legislature is able to prescribe
sentences for a single crime, however, one trial could accrue enough convictions
to subject the defendant to habitual offender penalties for later offenses. 14
These risks greatly outweigh the limited restrictions the double jeopardy prohi-
bition places on the legislature's power.
Although the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment may provide some protection against abuses of the legislature's power to
prescribe sentences, it does not obviate the necessity for the double jeopardy
guarantee. The Bill of Rights was intended to protect individuals against the
excesses of all three branches of government, rather than just one specific branch
134. The legislature has to comport not only with the double jeopardy clause but with other
constitutional limitations as well. See, eg., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment limits
how much punishment the legislature can permit, while the double jeopardy clause monitors the
sentencing procedure itself. Neither, however, greatly hampers the legislature. For a discussion of
the limited extent to which the eighth amendment regulates the legislature, see supra note 131 and
infra note 143.
135. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
136. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 373 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The creation of multiple crimes...
advances no valid state interest that could not just as easily be achieved without bringing multiple
charges against the defendant.").
137. Id. at 371-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 373 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Id.; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969).
140. This is not always the case, because some states would still count these convictions as one
conviction for the purpose of the habitual offender statute. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790-91. Other states,
however, count each conviction as a separate offense. The North Carolina statute, for example,
reads: "Any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to three felony offenses in any... court
... is declared to be a habitual felon." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1 (1986).
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of government.14 1 It is reasonable to presume that a particular amendment lim-
its all three branches of government unless the amendment limits its own scope.
In addition, the double jeopardy clause should limit the legislature as well as the
courts and prosecutors. First, all three branches of government have the ability
to violate the clause's mandate. Second, the eighth amendment operates against
the courts without rendering the double jeopardy guarantee superfluous.
14 2
Therefore, the existence of the eighth amendment as a limit on the legislature's
sentencing power does not make the double jeopardy prohibition
unnecessary. 
14 3
Not all of the objections to the Hunter rule stem from its conflict with the
Constitution; it has practical problems as well. First, Hunter further compli-
141. See Robideau, 419 Mich. at 509, 355 N.W.2d at 614 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting in part) (all
branches of government are obligated not to abridge constitutional guarantee of double jeopardy);
see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910). The Court in Weems asserted that the legisla-
ture's power is limited only by the provisions of the Constitution, "and what those are the judiciary
must judge." Id. The Weems Court declared a statute unconstitutional on eighth amendment
grounds but the Court's language implied that the Constitution as a whole limited the penological
power of the legislature. See id. at 378-79.
The Weems Court flatly rejected the contention that the eighth amendment had "ceased to be a
restraint upon legislatures and had become an admonition only to the courts." Id. at 376. The same
arguments proferred by advocates of this position with respect to double jeopardy law have similar
force in eighth amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the Court in Weems rejected this conten-
tion and found that the Constitution limits the scope of the legislature's sentencing power.
142. This argument could apply to the courts as well as the legislatures since punishment that
exceeds the punishment intended by the legislature is "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the
eighth amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Cf. State v. Greer, 270 N.C. 143, 146, 153 S.E.2d
849, 851 (1967) (stating that punishment imposed by a court is not unconstitutional if the statutes
permit it). Therefore, the clause arguably is superfluous as it applies to courts and prosecutors in
single prosecution situations. In a single trial, the double jeopardy clause arguably should not oper-
ate as a restraint at all, yet none of the cases have ever gone so far as to say this.
143. In addition, there are practical considerations. To understand these considerations it is
necessary to understand the development of eighth amendment law.
The eighth amendment provides that no "cruel and unusual punishments" shall be imposed
upon individuals. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Courts originally interpreted the amendment to forbid
torture; later, however, the Supreme Court extended the guarantee to preclude the imposition of
excessively long sentences. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In reviewing sentences
to determine whether they violate the eighth amendment, a court must decide whether a defendant's
sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the crime involved. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
271-73 (1980); Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder Punishments,
72 CALIF. L. REv. 1299, 1310-11 (1984). If the statute mandates the imposition of sentences so
harsh that they will always be disproportionate, then the statute itself violates the eighth amendment
guarantee and must be declared void. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 382 (statute invalid because even
minimum penalty "repugnant" and disproportionate to crime).
Because of the great deference accorded to the legislature, however, statutes themselves are
rarely challenged. Most cases involve challenges that focus on the application of the statute to the
situation involved in the case. Cf. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377 (most cases discussed based on sentences
of courts and not constitutionality of statutes). In North Carolina the deference accorded to the
general assembly is so great that it affects the analysis of the constitutionality of a sentence imposed
by a court. North Carolina courts have always held that "when the punishment does not exceed the
limits fixed by the statute, it cannot be considered cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional
sense." State v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 184, 150 S.E.2d 216, 224 (1966) (citations omitted); see State v.
Greer, 270 N.C. 143, 146, 153 S.E.2d 849, 851 (1967) (citing Bruce). This rule implies that courts
must base their analyses on the assumption that the statutes themselves are constitutional.
This deference is both natural and reasonable because the legislature is the branch of govern-
ment that defines offenses. Nevertheless, in spite of any overlap between the eighth amendment and
double jeopardy guarantees, the existence of the eighth amendment does not make it unnecessary to
apply the double jeopardy principle to restrain the legislature.
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cated an already confused area of the law. In contrast, Blockburger provided a
uniformly applicable, mechanical test for determining whether a defendant
could be sentenced twice. By examining either the facts alleged or the elements
necessary to prove the crimes, a court could determine whether multiple punish-
ments would result in a double jeopardy violation. The Hunter rule, on the
other hand, throws the task of determining legislative intent into the hands of
the courts. In some situations, intent may clearly be expressed in the statutes
themselves '44 and the courts do not have to determine their meaning. When the
intent of the legislature is not evident, however, courts must turn to other
sources. For example, the courts may examine the "subject, language, and his-
tory of the statutes." 14 5 Furthermore, they may consider the history of the
crime being prosecuted and draw some conclusion about the legislature's general
intent in that area of the law. 14 6 Finally, if the legislature's purpose is ambigu-
ous, the courts may apply the Blockburger test to determine the legislature's
intent. 147 However, neither the Court nor the Gardner court lay out any clear
guidelines for future courts to follow. The cases do not provide a coherent
framework for analysis. They also fail to explain exactly how evident a statute's
intent must be for courts to be able to impose multiple penalties.148
In addition to further entangling courts "in this Sargasso Sea," 149 the
Hunter rule effectively gives them a great deal more discretion by allowing the
144. The statute at issue in Hunter, for example, stated that "[tjhe punishment imposed pursu-
ant to this subsection [outlawing armed criminal action] shall be in addition to any punishment
provided by law for the crime committed by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a danger-
ous or deadly weapon." Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.015 (1986) (previously codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 559.225 (Supp. 1976)).
145. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 461, 340 S.E.2d at 712. The Gardner court apparently relied on
Robideau, which rejected the Blockburger standard in favor of this test. See Robideau, 419 Mich. at
486, 355 N.W.2d at 603. The Robideau court explained that its result is the traditional way to
analyze the issue. Id.
Moreover, language in Hunter suggests that this type of approach is acceptable. The Hunter
Court explained that Albernaz, discussed supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text, applied the
Blockburger rule because there had been no indication in the statutes or in the legislative history that
the legislature had intended to allow multiple punishment. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367.
146. Cf. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1958) (considering Congress' intent to
impose harsh penalties when violations of narcotics laws are involved). This standard is potentially
even more important than before in a single prosecution situation. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 56.
147. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 454-55, 340 S.E.2d at 708-09. The Gardner court distanced itself
from the Blockburger test even further, claiming that it is a federal rule that state courts need not
apply. See id. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709. The court apparently did not want to renounce Block-
burger, but its statement indicates the court's desire not to be bound by some rigid equation in
making its determinations. See infra note 148, and text accompanying notes 196-97.
148. In Hunter the statute itself declared that multiple punishment could be imposed. See supra
note 144. Therefore, no further investigation was necessary. The Gardner court apparently assumed
that courts have a great deal of power and discretion in determining legislative intent. The court
expressly rejected Blockburger as a mandatory rule, while retaining it as one of several factors that
the court may consider in evaluating the aim of the legislature. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 455, 340
S.E.2d at 709 (declaring that legislative intent clearly outweighs the Blockburger doctrine). Thus,
while not breaking with the current United States Supreme Court rule, the North Carolina Supreme
Court greatly limited the importance of the Blockburger doctrine in single prosecution situations.
This, too, is not necessarily inconsistent with Hunter. The primary difference in the North Carolina
rule is that Blockburger, instead of existing as the last factor considered, survives as a single factor
that the North Carolina courts may consider.
149. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 464, 340 S.E.2d at 714 (Exum, J., dissenting). The Gardner case itself
illustrates the confusion that may result. See infra notes 170-95 and accompanying text.
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courts to derive the formulas for themselves. A court can, for example, stress a
particular factor or look closely at one aspect of the legislative history to reach
and buttress its conclusion. There is also much more room for speculation re-
garding the intent of the legislature now that the courts have no mechanical test
to apply.150 Most significant of all, the decision of a state supreme court on this
topic is virtually unreviewable. As the Hunter majority pointed out, the
Supreme Court is bound to accept a state court's interpretation of its state stat-
utes.15 1 When a state court declares that it is either imposing or refusing to
impose multiple punishment because of the legislature's purpose, it effectively
insulates its decision from Supreme Court review. This result is especially ironic
in light of the Court's articulated purpose of revising double jeopardy law so that
it operates as a restraint only on the courts and prosecutors.
A third-practical problem is that the rule increases prosecutorial discretion.
When the legislature proscribes a certain act in several statutes and permits mul-
tiple punishment, the prosecutor gains a great deal of leverage in the plea bar-
gaining process. If five convictions are possible instead of one, it is much easier
for a prosecutor to bargain with a defendant by agreeing to drop one or more of
the counts brought against the defendant. Because plea bargaining plays such
an important role in criminal law, it is possible that prosecutors will want to use
this leverage to help secure deals more advantageous to the State. Thus, the
Hunter rule encourages prosecutors to bring more charges than they intend to
prosecute in order to gain a better bargaining position.
In spite of these practical problems, the Gardner court adopted the Hunter
rule. Pursuant to this rule, the North Carolina General Assembly may prescribe
multiple punishments under two identical statutes, and it can allow the courts to
penalize defendants for both offenses and their lesser included offenses.
The Gardner court emphatically stated, however, that this rule does not
apply to the felony-murder merger doctrine. 152 In so limiting double jeopardy
the court had to change the basis for the merger doctrine. North Carolina case
law stated that the underlying felony merged into the first degree murder charge
because it was an essential element of the murder charge.15 3 Thus, the cases
implicitly rested on a double jeopardy rationale. Some cases, such as State v.
Thompson,154 expressly justified the merger doctrine as an application of the
double jeopardy rule. 155 If it had recognized that the merger rule had been
150. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
151. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 (citing O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974)).
152. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 459-60, 340 S.E.2d at 711.
153. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 113, 257 S.E.2d 551, 567 (1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 941
(1980); State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 633, 213 S.E.2d 214, 228 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428
U.S. 903 (1976); see State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 75, 199 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1973); State v. Peele,
281 N.C. 253, 260, 188 S.E.2d 326, 331-32 (1972); State v. Bell, 205 N.C. 225, 227-28, 171 S.E. 50,
51-52 (1933).
154. 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
155. Id. at 215-16, 185 S.E.2d at 675; see also State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 506, 234 S.E.2d 563,
570, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 998 (1977) (citing Thompson); State v. Edmondson, 70 N.C. App. 426,
429, 320 S.E.2d 315, 317-18 (1984) (analogy between double jeopardy and felony murder "apt"
because underlying felony is "a statutorily-created element of the felony murder"), aff'd, 316 N.C.
187, 340 S.E.2d 110 (1986).
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rooted in double jeopardy, the court in Gardner would have had to concede that
the general assembly could overrule the doctrine by expressly authorizing multi-
ple penalties in the felony-murder statute.156 To avoid this result, the court held
that it could retain the felony-murder merger doctrine because the rule "is not
founded upon the concept of 'lesser-included offense' or upon the concept of
'indispensable element of the offense.' "157 Instead, the decision purported to
find a distinct basis for the rule: "The need to supply the element of malice
where, in the strict sense, none existed." 158
The court's statement, however, does not withstand analysis; the newly as-
serted rationale for the rule does not alter its actual basis. According to the
Gardner court, the malice necessary to prove the underlying felony raises the
killing to first-degree murder, but the felony itself is not a necessary element of
the felony-murder charge. 159 Yet, it is necessary to prove the underlying felony
to prove that malice. Thus, the state must prove the felony before it can obtain a
felony-murder conviction. "When it is impossible to commit a particular crime
without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of
lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a 'lesser included
offense.' "160 Because it is impossible to commit a felony murder without com-
mitting the felony, the felony is a lesser included offense of the murder. This is
true not only when the court states that it has relied on the felony itself, but
when it claims to use the "malice" element of the felony to raise the charge to
first-degree murder.
The court could not satisfactorily dispute this statement. It ultimately ad-
mitted that if the court applied a factual analysis, it would have to find that the
underlying felony is an element of a felony murder charge. But, the majority
argued this is irrelevant in a single prosecution case. In a successive prosecution
case, the court explained, a factual analysis would operate to preclude the sec-
ond trial on double jeopardy grounds. In a single trial, however, courts must
look only to the elements set forth in the statutes themselves.' 6' Because the
court claimed that only malice is statutorily required for the felony murder, no
double jeopardy issue arises in these cases. 162 Without a double jeopardy viola-
tion, the merger doctrine must rest on independent grounds.
Here again, the court's reasoning is weak. The court apparently overlooked
the words of the statute: "A murder ... which shall be committed in the perpe-
tration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape, or a sex offense, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a
156. The general assembly would still have had to state expressly its intent in order to overrule
the merger doctrine. As the Gardner court noted, the merger rule is firmly entrenched in North
Carolina law. The felony-murder rule does not contain that unambiguous expression of intent to
punish cumulatively that is a prerequisite to the imposition of multiple punishments.
157. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 458, 340 S.E.2d at 711.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 812 (5th ed. 1979).




deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree .... ,,163 Even if
malice is the necessary element of the felony that raises the killing to a felony
murder, the murder statute itself requires proof of the underlying offense.
Therefore, the felony is a "statutorily-created element of felony murder";164 a
definitional analysis mandates the conclusion that the felony is an element in-
cluded in the murder charge, and the ban on conviction of both offenses stems
from the double jeopardy rule.
Worse, although the court's language suggested some attempt to distinguish
the felony-murder merger situation from other instances involving multiple pun-
ishment, the court ultimately failed to base the preservation of the merger rule
on solid grounds. This is especially evident in the court's discussion of Whalen.
In Whalen the United States Supreme Court expressly found that the double
jeopardy clause prohibited the imposition of consecutive sentences for both fel-
ony murder and the underlying felony of rape: "It would seriously offend the
principle ... embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
if this Court were to [permit the imposition of consecutive sentences]." 165
Although the Court implied that it would permit multiple punishments pursuant
to legislative authorization, it held that to impose two sentences in violation of
legislative intent would constitute a violation of the double jeopardy
guarantee.
166
The Gardner court, however, ignored the words of the Supreme Court and
announced that "Whalen was decided not on the basis of double jeopardy, but
on the basis of legislative intent." 167 This statement indicates that the court did
not completely understand the double jeopardy rule set forth in Hunter. The
Hunter rule limits but does not eliminate the scope of the double jeopardy doc-
trine in a single trial situation. According to the Hunter court, the legislature's
intent determines whether double jeopardy comes into play in a single trial. 168
Therefore, under Hunter a legislature can either authorize multiple punishment
in a felony-murder case or prohibit consecutive sentences by insulating the case
under the double jeopardy clause. The entire analysis in Whalen revolves
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986).
164. State v. Edmondson, 70 N.C. App. 426, 429, 320 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1984).
165. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 695. The Whalen Court, applying a provision of the Code of the
District of Columbia, determined that the guarantee against double jeopardy contained in the fifth
amendment prevents federal courts from imposing punishments greater than those prescribed by
Congress. Id. In this respect, the Court added:
The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy embodies... simply one aspect of
the basic principle that within our federal constitutional framework the legislative power,
including the power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be
imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress."
Id. at 690. The Court noted that while "the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the
Federal Constitution is not mandatory on the States.... [t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment... would presumably prohibit state courts from depriving persons of liberty or prop-
erty as punishment for criminal conduct except to the extent authorized by state law." Id. at 690
n.4.
166. Id. at 689.
167. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 459, 340 S.E.2d at 711.
168. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 365-369.
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around the double jeopardy rule; the legislature is important because of its role
in determining whether there is a double jeopardy violation.
The court's analysis of the merger doctrine ultimately yields almost the
same conclusion that there would have been under a proper analysis. If the
court had conceded that an underlying felony is included in the felony murder,
then the general assembly simply could have amended the statute to state that it
intended to allow the courts to impose multiple penalties. As the court inter-
preted it, however, the merger doctrine is a firmly established common-law rule
that does not rest on a double jeopardy rationale. Nevertheless, the court had to
admit that the general assembly could still authorize multiple punishments and
overrule the common-law doctrine.169 The only way the court could have pre-
vented this result and forbidden multiple punishments would have been to con-
tinue to follow the old double jeopardy rule and conclude that the merger
doctrine was constitutionally mandated.
A further weakness in the Gardner decision lies in its application of the
Hunter rule. First, the court's investigation of legislative intent illustrates some
problems with the Hunter rule. The rule casts away the accepted standard for
determining whether multiple punishments are possible in a given situation.170
Instead, the Gardner court had to devise an alternative system of analysis. The
court chose what it claimed was "the traditional means of determining the intent
of the legislature where the concern is only one of multiple punishments for two
convictions in the same trial" by studying the subject, language, and history of
the statutes involved.
171
To begin with, common law made larceny a felony regardless of the value
of the stolen property. 172 In 1895 the general assembly changed the common-
law rule and made larceny a felony only when the value of the property stolen
was greater than twenty dollars. 173 The law, however, further provided that
larceny was a felony regardless of value when committed pursuant to a breaking
and entering. 174 Later versions of the law retained this provision. 175 The law
survives today in the North Carolina General Statutes.176 The Gardner court
argued that this history proved that the general assembly had intended to allow
multiple punishments. The court's theory was that the provision making lar-
ceny a felony regardless of value when it was committed pursuant to a breaking
or entering or other named crimes represented an attempt to carve out of the
169. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 459-60, 340 S.E.2d at 711-12.
170. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
171. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 461, 340 S.E.2d at 712. The court adopted the same standard articu-
lated in Robideau. See supra note 145.
172. State v. Cooper, 256 N.C. 372, 373, 124 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1962). But see infra text accompa-
nying notes 178-80 (explaining that larcenies still were not all treated equally under common-law
standards).
173. Act of March 13, 1895, ch. 285, § 1, 1895 N.C. Pub. L. 365, 365-66 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(b) (1986)).
174. Id. § 2, 1895 N.C. Pub. L. 365, 366 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (b)
(1986)). The current version makes larceny of goods valued in excess of $400 a felony.
175. See, eg., Act of May 19, 1969, ch. 522, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 447, 447 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. 14-72(b) (1986)).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(b) (1986).
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statute certain instances in which the old common-law rule applied. That rule
had made larceny a felony regardless of the circumstances under which it had
been committed. Therefore, the court reasoned that the provision did not con-
stitute a new rule in which the larceny charge was dependent on the breaking or
entering. 
177
The court's analysis of the issue is flawed. Even if the statutory provision
reflects a desire to retain some remnants of the common-law rule, the analysis
does not change. Regardless of the origins of the statute, the current version of
the law makes breaking or entering a necessary element of the charge of felony
larceny pursuant to breaking or entering. That the higher penalty is possible
only in certain circumstances reflects the general assembly's decision to distin-
guish certain instances of larceny that it felt deserved greater punishment.
More importantly, the court's statement that common-law larceny was a
felony regardless of the value of the goods stolen-the statement on which its
argument rests-is an extremely misleading characterization of the original rule.
The case that Gardner cites for this proposition, State v. Cooper,1 78 does not
state that all larcenies were treated equally under common-law standards. In-
stead, the Cooper court explained that, although both grand larceny and petit
larceny were felonies, the penalties for the two offenses differed. The punish-
ment for grand larceny was execution; petit larceny, on the other hand, was
punishable by whipping or other corporal punishment. 179 What distinguished
grand larceny from petit larceny was the value of the goods stolen. 180 There-
fore, although the statement that the common law made all larcenies felonies
regardless of the value of the goods stolen is accurate, the implication that all
larcenies were treated the same is false.
The court next analyzed judicial treatment of the two statutes.18 1 The
court first pointed to cases in which breaking or entering and larceny were said
to be separate and distinct crimes.18 2 The cases cited, however, held only that it
was possible to find a defendant guilty of breaking or entering but still acquit
that defendant of larceny. 183 Even if the breaking or entering was a lesser in-
177. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 461-62, 340 S.E.2d at 712-13.
178. 256 N.C. 372, 124 S.E.2d 91 (1962).
179. Id. at 373, 124 S.E.2d at 92.
180. Id.
181. This is of questionable importance in light of the court's emphasis on legislative intent.
Nonetheless, it is a valid avenue of investigation. As the Gardner court pointed out, case law may
shed some light on the legislature's intent; for, if the courts repeatedly misapplied the statutes, the
legislature probably would amend the statutes to make its intent clearer. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at
462-63, 340 S.E.2d at 713.
182. Id. at 462, 340 S.E.2d at 713.
183. In State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985), the court held that this was possible in a single trial.
The case rested on the ground that it was not legally inconsistent to find that someone had broken
into a building with the intent to steal and yet had not subsequently stolen any items. Id. at 184, 301
S.E.2d at 91. Because defendant was tried only once and sentenced only once, no double jeopardy
question arose.
This was not the case in State v. Hooker, 145 N.C. 581, 59 S.E. 866 (1907). Defendant in
Hooker was first acquitted of larceny and then, in a second trial, was convicted of breaking and
entering. Id. at 582, 59 S.E. at 866. If the larceny charge had been for felonious larceny pursuant to
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cluded offense of the larceny charge, this would be possible.
The supreme court also said that North Carolina courts have repeatedly
sustained multiple punishments under both statutes. 184 In two of the cases cited
for support, however, the multiple punishments were not challenged by the de-
fendants and therefore were not considered on appeal. 185 In the third case, State
v. Greer,186 the sentences were challenged, but on eighth amendment rather than
double jeopardy grounds. In addition, Greer involved charges for several differ-
ent offenses. In some of the larceny charges, the value of the goods exceeded
two hundred dollars. 187 For those offenses, the breaking or entering charges
were not necessary to establish felonious larceny. Therefore, it is possible that
no double jeopardy violations occurred.
Finally, the court claimed that State v. Morgan 188 approved multiple pun-
ishments for both offenses. 189 In Morgan defendant pled guilty to both felonious
breaking or entering and larceny and received consecutive sentences for the
crimes. On appeal, he claimed not that the sentences violated the guarantee
against double jeopardy but that his punishment was harsh and excessive. In
response to this charge, the court noted that defendant had received a sentence
of between two and four years for each conviction and that the maximum pen-
alty for each count was ten years. Limiting itself to this issue, the court summa-
rily affirmed the judgments.190 Thus, the Gardner court cited cases that lend
little support to the proposition that the general assembly intended to permit
multiple punishments.
There is a strong argument that the general assembly intended to allow
courts to sentence defendants on both counts. One can draw an inference of this
intent, for example, from observing that the penalty for felonious larceny is the
same as the penalty for felonious breaking or entering and significantly less than
the penalty that can be imposed for other offenses used to raise larceny to a
felony offense. 191 The Gardner court pointed out this anomaly, claiming it was
illogical that a crime would be considered a lesser included offense of another
crime that had a smaller penalty attached to it. 192 The court, however, did not
develop an even more compelling argument: It is illogical that the general as-
breaking or entering, and the breaking or entering was deemed to be a lesser included offense of the
larceny, then a successive prosecution would have been barred on double jeopardy grounds. See
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). The court in Hooker, however, did not indicate that the charge
was for felonious larceny or that the larceny was dependent on proof of a breaking or entering. The
court instead stated that "though some of the facts in [the larceny] case must be used in this case,
they are different offenses." Hooker, 145 N.C. at 583, 59 S.E. at 866. The two statutes therefore
must have passed the additional facts test. Id. at 584, 595 S.E. at 867.
184. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 462, 340 S.E.2d at 713.
185. State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 364 (1971); State v. Aaron, 29 N.C. App. 582, 225
S.E.2d 117, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 663, 228 S.E.2d 455 (1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977).
186. 270 N.C. 143, 153 S.E.2d 849 (1967) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 144-45, 153 S.E.2d at 849-50.
188. 265 N.C. 597, 144 S.E.2d 633 (1965) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Jones, 275 N.C. 432, 168 S.E.2d 380 (1969).
189. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 462, 340 S.E.2d at 713.
190. Morgan, 265 N.C. at 598, 144 S.E.2d at 633.
191. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-52, 14-54, 14-57, 14-72(b)(2) (1986).
192. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 463, 340 S.E.2d at 713-14.
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sembly would intend for the offense with the greater penalty to merge into the
larceny charge whenever the former was used to raise the latter to a felony. If
the underlying charge was not used to raise the larceny to a felony, then a de-
fendant could be sentenced for both larceny and the other offense. It seems
unlikely that the general assembly would have intended for a greater sentence to
be possible when courts convicted individuals of misdemeanor larceny rather
than felonious larceny.
Justice Exum, however, made a strong argument to the contrary. At the
time the statutes were adopted, he noted, both state and federal double jeopardy
doctrine prohibited the imposition of multiple punishments for an offense and its
lesser included offense. Therefore, "our legislature would not have thought it
had the power to authorize punishment for both .... -193 It seems quite reason-
able to presume that the two statutes conformed to the then existing constitu-
tional standards.' 94 Because this presumption is not rebutted by any direct
evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, 195 it is at least unclear that the
general assembly possessed a contrary intent.
At best, then, the Gardner court allowed multiple punishments pursuant to
ambiguous evidence of legislative intent. In addition, the method by which it
determined intent was much more makeshift than the prior additional facts test.
The court greatly increased its ability and discretion in reviewing statutes for
double jeopardy purposes. In the absence of express legislative authorization of
multiple punishments, North Carolina courts apparently review the history of
the statutes, the history of the common-law rule, judicial interpretation of the
statutes, and the results of a Blockburger additional facts analysis. Presumably,
the subject, language, and history of the statute are fairly significant factors in
the analysis.' 96 There are, however, no clearly delineated rules to guide North
Carolina courts in their consideration of these topics. Courts are left to weigh
and balance these factors as they please. This is further illustrated by the Gard-
ner court's declaration that Blockburger established a federal rule "neither bind-
ing on state courts nor conclusive." 1 97 Nor does this statement constitute a
radical departure from recent United States Supreme Court doctrine. The
Blockburger test already has been relegated to a secondary position in the single
prosecution/double jeopardy analysis. The statement nevertheless signifies an
effort on the part of the court to free itself further from rigid guidelines in this
area.
Because Gardner leaves so much to the discretion of both the general as-
sembly and the courts, it is unclear what the result of the new double jeopardy
193. Id. at 471, 340 S.E.2d at 718 (Exum, J., dissenting).
194. See State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 23, 340 S.E.2d 35, 41 (1986) (although Gardner over-
ruled Midyette and established a new standard in North Carolina, statutes enacted or revised prior to
Gardner must be interpreted with the assumption that the legislature was complying with the old
standard). Freeland is discussed infra text accompanying notes 198-201.
195. See Gardner, 315 N.C. at 471-72, 340 S.E.2d at 718-19 (Exum, J., dissenting).
196. See State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 21-22, 340 S.E.2d 35, 40 (1986); Gardner, 315 N.C. at
461, 340 S.E.2d at 712.
197. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709.
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rule will be. Cases decided after Gardner shed little light on the situation. They
have all followed State v. Freeland,198 which applied "the Gardner test for deter-
mining legislative intent by examining the subject, language, and history of the
statutes" 199 and concluded that the general assembly did not intend to permit
multiple punishments for first-degree rape and first-degree sexual assault, along
with first-degree kidnapping.2° ° Ironically, the Freeland facts paralleled the sit-
uation in Gardner-one of the first two charges had been used to raise the kid-
napping to a first-degree offense. In Freeland, however, the supreme court
reached a contrary result. It based its decision largely on a "significant" fact
that had been overlooked by the Gardner court in its consideration of the feloni-
ous larceny and felonious breaking and entering charges. When the statutes
were enacted and when they were amended, Midyette's holding that the State
could not in a single trial do what double jeopardy law prohibited in successive
trials was still good law. Therefore, the Freeland court assumed that the statutes
did not permit multiple punishments.
20 1
Subsequent cases dealing with the rape and sexual assault statutes have fol-
lowed Freeland. Only one of these, State v. Belton,20 2 referred to the inconsis-
tency of the rationales on which Freeland and Gardner were based. The court
failed to explain the difference in result; instead, it merely noted that in Gardner
"this Court reached a different result in the context of a breaking and larceny
case on the basis of what this Court perceived to be a different legislative in-
tent."'20 3 Because the court did not criticize the Gardner court's reasoning, it is
not clear whether the presumption applied to the statutes involved in Freeland
will modify the power of the courts to interpret legislative intent.
The Gardner court failed in its attempt to clarify North Carolina double
jeopardy law. The court first adopted a rule that contravenes the constitutional
rights of defendants. In its place the court substituted a new standard for deter-
mining whether multiple punishments may be imposed. The new standard suc-
ceeds in its effort to increase legislative discretion by eliminating part of the
constitutional barrier of the fifth amendment. The general assembly's penologi-
cal power, however, was already quite broad, and the increase is not significant.
In increasing the general assembly's power, the court increased its own as
well. The court took the Hunter requirement of a "clear and unambiguous"
expression of legislative intent and interpreted it to allow courts to look beyond
a legislature's expression of that intent. State courts may now examine a stat-
ute's legislative history in determining whether multiple punishments are per-
missible. This enables courts to impose cumulative punishments even when the
general assembly has not expressly authorized it. The Gardner decision opens
the door to consecutive sentencing even wider than necessary under Hunter.
198. 316 N.C. 13, 340 S.E.2d 35 (1986).
199. Id. at 21-22, 340 S.E.2d at 40.
200. Id. at 23-24, 340 S.E.2d at 40-41.
201. Id. at 22-24, 340 S.E.2d at 40-41.
202. 318 N.C. 141, 347 S.E.2d 755 (1986).
203. Id. at 160-61 n.10, 347 S.E.2d at 767 n.10.
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Finally, the court's new standard has further entangled the courts in the
confusion that marks this area of the law. This confusion is evident when one
looks at cases such as Freeland, which apply Gardner's ambiguous "subject, lan-
guage, and history" test to reach conclusions that are inconsistent with Gardner.
Even if the North Carolina courts retain the Hunter rule, the state supreme
court should formulate a new criterion that is both easier to apply and better
effectuates the purpose behind giving the general assembly the authority to per-
mit multiple punishments in a single trial.
BETH HERSTEIN
